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POLITICAL SURVIVAL OR ENTREPRENEURIAL
DEVELOPMENT? OBSERVATIONS ON RUSSIAN
BUSINESS NETWORKS
Peter Huber and Andreas Wörgötter1
Networks are hybrid forms between hierarchies and markets.
The present article focuses on the structure of Russian business net-
works and their potential for integration into European business net-
works. In Russia, two competing types of networks can currently be
identified: survival networks and entrepreneurial networks. In the latter,
the main interests of the enterprise managers are to improve market
performance and profits. But in the former, enterprise managers are
involved in a large “rent-seeking” game, in which political and market
power are the major means by which rents are extracted. Managers
within survival networks evaluate both internal and external business
relationships with reference to their effects on rent-extraction capaci-
ties. In Russia today, survival networks predominate and entre-
preneurial networks are relatively few in number.
BUSINESS NETWORKS IN A “NORMAL” ENVIRONMENT
In institutional economics, attention to networks has been
driven by the realization that many innovations are taking place
primarily in the space between markets and hierarchies (Lindenberg
1996). Many phrases have been used to describe these hybrid forms:
symbiotic contracts (Schanze 1993); networks (Williamson 1991);
clans (Ouchi 1980). Business networks, which we define as sets of
connected exchange relationships between actors controlling busi-
ness activities, have been interpreted as important contributors to
regional development and as determinants of the comparative ad-
vantage of nations (Porter 1990).
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The business relationships that comprise networks may differ
in form, such as whether they are based on trade or capital ties. The
relationships may also differ in content, such as whether they are
based on common technologies, knowledge, administrative rou-
tines, or social ties. Moreover, business relationships tend to be
highly complex, involving more than one activity and requiring sub-
stantial efforts to resolve the conflicts that inevitably arise. Then too
the bases of relationships tend to change over time; indeed, mutual
adaptation of the partners is typical, as a result of which cooperation
may be reduced, intensified, or shifted to new bases. On the whole,
though, and notwithstanding these adaptations, business relation-
ships in mature economies tend to be relatively stable.2
Why do such networks arise? A number of theories have been
advanced. Transaction costs theory (Williamson 1975) holds that net-
works arise as a special institutional arrangement—governance
structure or mechanism of cooperation—for handling problems that
combine asset specificity, bounded rationality, and human opportun-
ism.3 Williamson (1991) argues that the particular advantage of net-
works over other methods of coordinating human economic
activities (such as hierarchies and markets) is that they minimize
transaction costs in cases of medium asset specificity and a high need
for flexibility.
Empirical research has gone part of the way toward confirming
this hypothesis. Business networks have been more prevalent in in-
dustries that require high flexibility—due to rapidly developing
markets—and substantial human capital. Examples include net-
works of universities and biochemical enterprises (Powell 1996) and
the consumer electronics industry (Ernst 1995). Networks are also
more prevalent in cases in which producers have found innovative
ways to upgrade standardized products by linking themselves to
upstream enterprises through the creation of limited asset specificity.
Examples include woodworking and pulp-processing networks
spanning Denmark and Sweden (Hakanson and Snehota 1995) and
quality-label poultry in France (Menard 1996). At the same time,
empirical research has qualified Williamson’s hypothesis. The origi-
nal architecture of networks is often influenced heavily by such fac-
tors as enterprise culture, history, and the institutional background
available during the process of creation. Thus, Zysman (1995) has
found that networks in Southeast Asia and the United States differ
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substantially between nations with respect to their openness and
verticality—that is, the ease with which networks are penetrated by
outsiders and the extent to which they are organized as groups of
social peers.4
NETWORKS IN THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY
Networks emerge within concrete cultural, historical, and insti-
tutional environments and are subject to continuous evolutionary
change. The context within which they have arisen in Russia is quite
different from that in mature market economies, which should lead
us to expect their structure and consequences to be different as well.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Networks in transition economies predate the collapse of com-
munism. They were formed during the era of state planning, prod-
ucts of both the trade relationships of that era and the unofficial ties
that emerged within the gray and black markets. But the nature of
the networks was different from those in mature market economies
owing to the extremely hierarchical nature of central planning, the
absence of prices as means of generating meaningful information,
and the exclusive concentration on quantity of production
(Hirschhausen and Hsui 1995). Organized around territorial indus-
trial complexes, official relationships between firms mainly served
delivery functions. Joint ventures in research and licensing relation-
ships—characteristic of business networks in mature market econo-
mies—were almost completely lacking. And to mitigate the costs of
planning, transactions between firms were highly integrated hori-
zontally, such that the number of transactions was relatively small
(Rühl 1995).
The networks that derived from the gray and black markets
were also distinctive. Relationships within these markets were based
on personal ties, such as friendship, rather than on impersonal busi-
ness ties. While the authorities tolerated these networks, they also
eyed them with suspicion. Accordingly, the networks had to be less
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formal and more conspiratorial than those which predominate in
market economies.
Substantial empirical evidence concerning corporate structures
and financial-industrial groups (FIGs) in Russia suggests that rela-
tionships forged under the planning system remain operative, espe-
cially in large-scale industry. Thus, according to Gorbatova (1995),
banks that had once channeled export financing and credits to in-
dustrial enterprises have remained closely linked to those enter-
prises even after their organizational devolution, and in some cases
emerged as owners of those firms. Similarly, Gurkov and Asselsberg
(1995) found that as of 1994, old, excessively long transport routes
for products were still being used, despite their economic irrational-
ity.5 Finally, historical continuity has been maintained by the priva-
tization of the former departments (glavki) of ministries. These were
transformed into joint stock companies; they now provide consult-
ancy and export services to their former clientele (Starodubrovskaia
1995).6
Some evidence also exists of price discrimination by old net-
works against new ones. Dolgopiatova and Evseyeva (1995), for ex-
ample, found that in 1993, 10 percent of the managers of state-owned
enterprises that they interviewed refused to work with managers of
private firms, and 45.7 percent stated that they would do so only
under dire necessity.
At the same time, newly founded enterprises are building new
networks of their own. Freinkman (1995) argued that the under-
ground enterprises (tsekhi) founded during the Gorbachev era usu-
ally had good connections to both criminal and political circles and
may have served as points for the crystallization of new network
structures.
PRODUCTION PROCESSES
One legacy of the planned economy was a production structure
in which enterprises were unusually large relative to the resource
markets in which they were located. Russian enterprises, accord-
ingly, differ from American counterparts less in their total size than
in their level of concentration (Joskow, Schmalensee, and Tsukanova
1994). An extreme example is Krasnoyarsk kray. Of the ten towns
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with more than ten thousand inhabitants, six are dominated by one
producer, employing more than 40 percent of the townships’ work-
force. Indeed, for many of these towns the next possibility for em-
ployment is several hundred kilometers away (Huber, Nagaev, and
Wörgötter 1996). Although Krasnoyark is extreme, the phenomenon
is widespread. This means that in many Russian localities, there will
not be enough diversity of enterprises to support the construction of
new networks.
This monopsonistic position of firms on labor markets has ad-
ditional implications. They can get away with not paying workers
their overdue wages, even when the enterprises are profitable.7 They
have a strong influence on regional politics, due in part to their
contributions to regional budgets.8 But because these firms are also
highly dependent on the localities in which they produce, they will
feel threatened by the entry of new enterprises into the region—even
in sectors that do not compete directly with the indigenous
firms—because new entrants will weaken the strategic positions of
firms in regional input markets. Then too managers of large enter-
prises use these as bases of power for activities outside the enterprise
that serve as major sources of income. Thus, in 1994, the majority of
managers of formerly state-owned enterprises owned a multitude of
firms (Gurkov and Asselsberg 1995). Similarly, Bim (1996) found that
73 percent of managers interviewed admitted to owning firms that
were either deliverers or suppliers to the very firm they managed. It
is not surprising, therefore, that harassment of new firms is a com-
mon phenomenon in these regions. Given these orientations, we find
little organization of production on the basis of relatively open and
nonhierarchical networks.
A second feature likely to influence the nature of emerging
networks in Russia lies in the production structure of Russian in-
dustry itself. The typical Russian producer is an enterprise that is
horizontally integrated, located in heavy industry and/or mass pro-
duction of standardized goods, and uses relatively few specific
assets. Such a technological profile is not well suited to network
creation, unlike, for example, the electronics producers of Central
Asia or other instances of production that foster cross-border net-
works.
The environment surrounding the firms is also less supportive
of network creation than is the case in mature market economies. The
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socialist enterprise itself provided most services, whether these were
social or producer (such as auditing). This applied in particular to
the organization of financial relationships. The result is that in Rus-
sia, in many instances, banks are heavily dependent on, or directly
belong to, the enterprises for which they organize trade.
THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The institutional environment of firms gives additional impe-
tus to the maintenance of survival networks and efforts to monopo-
lize entry. The stark realities of transition make clear to Russian
managers where their interests lie. Certain institutional changes are
clear threats to their political and material security, and they will use
their powers to prevent them.9 Rühl (1995), for example, has argued
that the inter-enterprise arrears crisis is sustained by enterprise man-
agers’ knowledge of their power to induce the central government
repeatedly to bail them out.
This willingness to use their powers to tilt balances in their
favor is reinforced by the knowledge that most decisions taken dur-
ing the transition have long-term implications. Hence, even if some
costs are associated with the exertion of power, the long-run
gains—or loss-avoidance—may be very large. Moreover, the lack of
a fixed, consistent institutional and legal framework makes it almost
impossible to abstain from the power-political game or to stay within
the bounds of legality when conducting business. The inevitable
legal breaches allow actors to compromise even those unwilling to
play at the power game.
TYPES OF RUSSIAN BUSINESS NETWORKS
As noted, we divide networks in Russia into two ideal types:
survival and entrepreneurial.10 Survival networks encompass enter-
prises that see little future for themselves in competitive market
conditions; indeed, they are formed with the explicit goal of isolating
participants from market competition. The purpose of the network
is short-term rent extraction from the government—i.e., lobbying.
The network structure is based on ties created during the socialist
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era. Entrepreneurial networks, by contrast, are composed of actors
that seek to compete in the new markets by developing economically
viable activities. Two types of entrepreneurial networks can be iden-
tified: those that build on old structures and those composed of new
structures.11 Survival and entrepreneurial networks differ with re-
spect to their architecture and their orientation toward cooperation
with new foreign partners and toward the marketization process in
Russia today.
SURVIVAL NETWORKS
The predominant goal of actors within survival networks is to
protect or maximize their power to extract rents, which can be quite
large in the conditions of Russia today. Those rents may be used to
gain riches, to avert bankruptcy, or both. Moreover, since increasing
one’s power requires dedicated followers and since the allegiance of
a new member is always hard to assess, survival networks will be
relatively closed. And since increasing power also requires substan-
tial control over the power base, survival networks will also be
highly vertical. Finally, survival networks favor stability of member-
ship and relationships over time.
The attitude toward interaction with foreigners is ambivalent.
On the one hand, foreign participation can be a source of new financ-
ing, which can often be deflected for private use. On the other hand,
Western foreign firms are interested in profits and typically seek to
impose controls that endanger the ability of network members to
extract rents from their enterprises. The preferred interaction with
foreign firms, therefore, especially on the part of actors in the top
levels of the network, is trade.
ENTREPRENEURIAL NETWORKS
The driving force behind entrepreneurial networks is profit-
motivated actors. Some of these are actors recruited from old enter-
prises who believe their firms are capable of being restructured and
made profitable. Others are new entrants: enterprises founded by
actors previously not involved in the power game within the social-
ist economy.
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Genuinely new firms are quite rare in Russia; most new en-
trants are products of the splitting up of state-owned enterprises and
changes in legal forms. In addition to being relatively few in number,
entrepreneurial networks based on new entrants are quite disadvan-
taged in the power struggle. They are led by individuals with limited
experience and are not well positioned to defend themselves politi-
cally. Consequently, networks composed of these actors tend to be
unstable, open, and horizontal. Entrepreneurial networks therefore
look to foreign partners to help them survive despite their disadvan-
tages; any form of cooperation and activity from abroad is welcome
to these actors. Yet, as stand-alone institutions, they are usually too
weak to prosper or survive in the conditions of Russia today.
Entrepreneurial networks based on old structures are better
positioned, however. They are led by individuals who are more ex-
perienced and who have a historic, more stable power base. Relative
to survival networks and new entrepreneurial networks, they are
marked by intermediate levels of openness and verticality of archi-
tecture. They are open to foreign cooperation to the extent that it
enhances their profitability and their capacity to restructure existing
enterprises. Since the latter requires substantial capital, they prefer
foreign direct investment to other forms of cooperation.
THE EVOLUTION OF NETWORK TYPES
Which kinds of networks are established in any given region
depends on the interests of the managers of industrial enterprises in
that region and the power base available to the actors within the
network. In regions in which very few firms dominated input and
output markets before economic reform, those firms retain the power
to harass new entrants by discriminating against them on markets
and by intervening against them in politics. In Russia today, the
degree of monopolization and monopsonization varies greatly
across regions and industries. Thus, while the situation in Kras-
noyarsk is very well suited to rent-extraction activities, other regions
are marked by much less industrial concentration.12 This is apparent
from aggregate data. Huber, Nagaev, and Wörgötter (1997), con-
structing herfindahl indexes covering the regions of Russia and
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twelve industries within those regions, find that the indicator varies
from 0.65 to 0.12. Similarly, industries differ substantially in their
concentration statistics. Some industries are heavily localized in one
region, such as nonferrous metallurgy in Krasnoyarsk and fuel in
Tyumen’. Others have no such geographical specialization (Huber,
Nagaev, and Wörgötter 1996b).
Whether managers are inclined to enter survivalist networks is
predominantly a function of their expectations of the future. Actors
who see few chances of surviving in the new circumstances will be
more prone to adopt a survivalist stance than those who see some
future for their enterprise. However, other factors may enter into the
calculation as well. Within survival networks, there is a clear center-
periphery dimension to the rent-extraction process. The old, now
privatized departments (glavki) of the industrial ministries in the
center usually control both foreign trade and the network itself.
Thus, the center extracts much of the rent that might otherwise have
gone to local actors. This may tempt actors in the periphery to opt
out of the survivalist network, but such defection has its costs. For
example, in the forestry sector, most of the transport facilities remain
under the control of the center, and discriminatory pricing, also a
prerogative of the center, can make products from the periphery
uncompetitive in international markets.
Given the huge reduction in output in Russia during the past
decade and given the incidence of concentration that provides a
power base, it is not surprising that survival networks are the pre-
dominant form in Russia today. But what of the future? It seems
obvious that from an evolutionary standpoint, a strategy concerned
primarily with reducing the value of existing assets is not fit to sur-
vive in the long run. This would favor the eventual strengthening of
entrepreneurial networks. Indeed, state-owned firms have already
begun to notice that new private customers are more reliable in meet-
ing their payments. The real question is how long existing survivalist
networks can be expected to survive. We suspect that Russian net-
works will evolve into an entrepreneurial form only over a very long
period of time. The time frame may be shorter in regions and sectors
in which industry is least concentrated. But for the most part, the
size of the rents still to be distributed is large, as is the ingenuity and
persistence of the actors operating within survivalist networks.
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INTEGRATION INTO INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS
The integration of Russia into international production net-
works will remain a difficult task and may fail altogether. Most Rus-
sian partners will assess agreements principally in terms of the
impact on their position in the internal struggle for power and the
impact on their capacity to continue extracting rents. Foreign owners
who emphasize profitability endanger the rent-extraction process.
This bodes ill for joint ventures. Projects that are concerned with
employment reduction will also face opposition from survivalist net-
works. Activities geared toward upstream or downstream coopera-
tion in existing markets are more difficult to achieve than activities
geared toward selling products in new markets. Integration is also
hampered by technological realities: large Russian enterprises are
generally not flexible in their production processes and do not spe-
cialize in technologically advanced products.
The regional distribution of foreign direct investments as a per-
centage of total investments in the Russian Federation is indicative
of the conditions beneficial to such investments. A clear industrial-
geographical pattern emerges. Oil-rich Tyumen’ leads with 17.86
percent of the total, and its two autonomous districts, which are also
oil-rich, stand immediately behind. The capital city of Moscow, a
“port of entry,” follows with 11.97 percent of the investments. The
other places in which capital investments were clustered were either
regions that experienced relatively small output declines during the
transition (Samara, Chelyabinsk, Bashkortostan) or that are rela-
tively rich in resources (Sakha Yakut, Irkutsk) or that are located
close to the sea (Caucasus) (Wörgötter 1997). As for the sectoral dis-
tribution of foreign direct investments, as of April 1995, 17.66 percent
of all foreign investments had gone into the fuel industry (Stern
1996), making it the second largest branch in this respect after do-
mestic trade. The forestry industry is the third largest recipient.
European networks are not the only option for Russian enter-
prises. The Commonwealth of Independent States and/or the Rus-
sian Far East are also potential loci of integration. At present, all
three regions have been objects of such network creation. Such crea-
tion follows clear regional and sectoral patterns, often dictated by
the transportation costs of products. Siberian regions, for example,
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have developed close ties to East Asian countries (Tak 1994a, 1994b;
Obersteiner 1995).
CONCLUSION
Survivalist networks, which predominate in Russia, tend to be
closed and hierarchical. When entering Russian business networks,
foreigners must anticipate that their welcome will depend strongly
on the effects of their presence on the rent-extraction capacities of
existing enterprise managers. This stands in sharp contrast to the
international business networks observed in most Western countries,
in the design of which profitability is the main goal; these tend to be
substantially more open and less hierarchical in their structure.
Thus, any efforts to incorporate Russian firms into European net-
works face major obstacles. Entrance costs into Russian producer
networks are high since time is needed to understand the highly
complex internal structures. Largely for internal power reasons, Rus-
sian partners often fail to negotiate mutually favorable agreements
and fail to show flexibility in their dealings. The goals of Russian
managers working in survival networks will often diverge funda-
mentally from those of Western partners working in entrepreneurial
networks. Given these differences in structure and interests, it is
quite possible that Russian networks will remain relatively secluded
from European networks and that existing network structures in
Russia will become instruments largely for preserving the institu-
tional status quo in that country.
To be sure, countervailing tendencies exist. In some areas of the
Russian economy, entrepreneurial networks are more frequently
found. In economically less powerful regions and industries, with
smaller-scale enterprises producing food and other consumer prod-
ucts, networks tend to be less hierarchical, more open, more profit-
oriented, and more flexible. Currently, the number and importance
of such networks are relatively low. But in the long run, competitive
forces are at work that may help them to proliferate.
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NOTES
 1. This article originally appeared in Post-Soviet Affairs 14, 1 (January– March
1998: 81–91. It is reprinted here with permission from Post-Soviet Affairs.©V.
H. Winston & Son, Inc., 360 South Ocean Boulevard, Palm Beach, Fla. 33480.
All rights reserved.
 2. Hakansson and Snehota (1995), for example, report that more than 70 per-
cent of the suppliers of large companies in Sweden did not change over a
ten-year period.
 3. Asset specificity refers to the degree to which a particular asset is specific
to one particular relationship and cannot be used in potential alternative
relationships. High asset specificity thus gives rise to situations of bilateral
monopoly.
 4. For a similar typology, see Park (1996).
 5. However, they also found that this was not ubiquitous and that many
enterprises had changed their customers.
 6. For more on financial-industrial groups in Russia, see Johnson (1997).
 7. Although Krasnoyarsk has the third highest profit rate among Russian
krays, it also has the fifth highest rate of unpaid wages (Huber, Nagaev,
and Wörgötter 1996a).
 8. In Tomsk, for example, 80 percent of the budget revenues to the oblast’
administration come from one oil-producing firm (Tomskneft); see Huber,
Nagaev, and Wörgötter (forthcoming).
 9. Frey (1977) has argued that constitutional questions can be solved only
under a veil of ignorance, in which it is not clear whether a particular
member of society will profit or lose from a particular agreement.
10. Starodubrovskaia (1995) refers to “survival” and “developmental” finan-
cial-industrial groups. We stress that ours are ideal types which do not exist
in pure form. In the real world, elements of both types may well be mixed
within a given network. However, real-world networks may be distin-
guished by the predominance of one or the other element.
11. This division is also ideal-typical since old and new entrepreneurial net-
works interact and form alliances. The distinction, however, usefully high-
lights the fact that old structures are quite diverse and are not necessarily
survivalist. For examples, see Prokop (1995).
12. On Tomsk, see Huber, Nagaev, and Wörgötter (forthcoming).
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